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Tropical commodities such as timber, oil palm, coffee, 
soy or cocoa are commonly considered drivers of 
deforestation. Illegal agricultural land clearing is a 
debatable concept but it has been responsible for 
half of tropical deforestation since 2000 (Lawson 
2014). Both the private sector and governments have 
started to acknowledge that some of these supply 
chains were not fully in compliance with national laws 
of the countries where products are grown (Lawson, 
2015). The FLEGT approach has been designed by the 
European Union to deal with those two interrelated 
issues of legality and deforestation. Starting with timber, 
it encourages forest law enforcement, government and 
private sector transparency on forest activities, and 
participation of stakeholders for better governance. 
The EU also commits to stopping the import of illegal 
timber through a system of VPA (Voluntary Partnership 
Agreement) licenses and a due diligence approach. A 
reflection has started on the relevance of an extension 
of such a public-public agreement to other commodity 
chains such as cocoa and on the sustainability potential 
of legal cocoa in the context of increasing demand for 
sustainable and “zero-deforestation” cocoa and the 
private sector publicly making commitments to end 
deforestation (New York Declaration on Forests 2014). 
This question is studied in two different contexts: the 
“rebirth” of the cocoa sector in Cameroon and the post 
cocoa-boom challenges in Ivory Coast.
Cocoa is vastly illegal or a-legal – 
does this make it unsustainable?
In both countries the sector is experiencing structural 
changes. For decades, Cameroon was an exception in 
the cocoa world, with very limited migration: until the 
1970s, most cocoa was produced by very small farms 
(1-2 ha) created mainly by customary owners, under 
exceptional heavy shade, in the south of the country. 
This was in high contrast to larger smallholdings in 
Ivory Coast (6-7 ha), based on massive migration and 
zero-shade systems developed since the late 1960s 
(Leplai-deur and Ruf 1981). The migration process then 
gained in importance in Cameroon, the M’Bam and 
more significantly, the South-west regions (Losch et al., 
1991). More recently, Cameroon has started to face the 
emergence of high-input capitalized elite agriculture, 
an adoption of full-sun systems, and political will for  
intensification and “modernization” (Pédélahore 2014).
In the meantime, the Ivorian cocoa sector consumed 
most of the forest in the country until the 2010s at the 
expense of “gazetted forests” and national parks. It was 
simultaneously challenged by the post-boom situation 
in many regions, with the depletion of forests, the 
ageing of fields, pests and disease attacks, and social 
conflicts (Ruf 1987; Ruf et al. 2018). In such contexts, 
the present legal framework can contribute to grant 
sustainability but its implementation faces serious 
obstacles in both countries: customary and formal land 
rights overlap, few smallholders own land titles, and 
labor contracts for workers are not frequent. In Ivory 
Coast, child labor and permanent forest encroachment 
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are also significant legal issues. However, 
most legal constraints do not relate to 
cocoa production per se but to the general 
conditions for creating a cocoa plantation (with 
requirements for land and forest) or, mainly, to 
imposing conditions for marketing and export.
The regulatory framework provides little 
incentive to support sustainability at the 
cocoa production phase, for instance, when 
it comes to issues like deforestation, forest 
degradation, chemical use, working conditions 
and farmers living standards. To fill these gaps, 
ten years ago, private certification standards 
(especially UTZ and Rainforest Alliance) 
appeared to deal with these sustainability 
issues at the producer level.
Is certified cocoa legal cocoa?
Ivory Coast has experienced massive expansion of 
certification (UTZ certified 600 000 tons of cocoa in 
2016) in the last ten years and this approach is flourishing 
in Cameroon (UTZ certified 55 000 tons of cocoa in 
2018). Farming standards aim to answer rather generic 
sustainability issues (child labor, yields, democratic 
organizations) with few adjustments to national/local 
specificities.
Contrary to timber certification, legal compliance is not 
a concern put forward in cocoa certification even if it 
must take into account the national laws of the countries 
where crops are grown. When the law is stricter than the 
standard, the law is supposed to apply, when the standard 
is stricter and does not contradict the law, the standard 
may apply and rely on international texts. For instance, 
in the case of child labor, the minimum age of a worker 
set by Sustainable Agriculture Network standards is 15 
years old whereas Cameroon law sets this age at 14 years 
old. To define authorized land conversion, certification 
standards firstly rely on national laws (protected areas, 
forest concessions, land rights) but add stricter principles 
set by High Conservation Value zoning.
Legislation compliance is a broad frame but not the target 
of cocoa certification. As many land and work laws are not 
enforced in rural areas there is a great share of “illegal” 
cocoa. Therefore, certified cocoa does not necessarily 
mean legally produced cocoa.A ripe pod of cocoa, ready to be collected. 
Photo by Guillaume Lescuyer. 
Bags of dry beans are checked at the exporter’s 
warehouse. 
Photo by Guillaume Lescuyer. 
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In Cameroon, some producer representatives even 
insist on contractual aspects of certification that could 
be at the edge of the law. Once exporters have funded 
the certification of a cooperative and its members, 
the latter have to sell their cocoa to the exporter who 
funded them. Such moral contracts can ease the 
situation of some cooperatives to find buyers but they 
may give buyers an advantage in price negotiations.
As certified cocoa is similar to conventional cocoa, it 
cannot be specifically identified and tracked. It is often 
difficult for cooperatives to resist the temptation to mix 
both. This generates hidden and informal revenues 
mostly to cooperatives. Moreover, exporters are 
authorized to apply a “mass balance” principle, i.e. 
to mix certified and non-certified beans in the same 
processing unit and to sell certified chocolate in the 
same proportion. This practice is also allowed for timber 
in the FSC procedure – mainly for paper production – 
but it raises some doubt about whether it really stands 
for what the consumers think they are buying (Ruf et 
al. 2013).
Taking into account these limits, is there a role for 
certification for more sustainable cocoa?
Has certification prepared the 
ground for legal cocoa ?
Two main structural changes setting the basis for a 
FLEGT-like approach could be theoretically expected 
from certification: production traceability and platforms 
for better stakeholder participation in the value chain. 
Any comparison between timber and cocoa, from the 
perspective of extending a FLEGT approach, has to 
take into account an important difference between 
the two commodity chains: in the case of cocoa, at the 
first step of the chain there are thousands of farmers 
and their agronomic choices. Farm managements 
or cooperative organizations are too often “a black 
box” for outsiders and traceability is a challenge. 
Nevertheless, it is within this “black box” that decisions 
affecting sustainability are taken. Beyond a public 
traceability framework where every purchase of 
cocoa has to be reported, UTZ and RA have set 
their own traceability system. However, it only grants 
traceability from the first buyer (in other words: from 
the cooperative). For a legal approach such as FLEGT, 
traceability must start in the cocoa field at the producer 
level. Indeed, production legality cannot be guaranteed 
and environmental impacts estimated without taking 
into account what happens in cocoa fields.
It is too early to evaluate the structural changes brought 
about by certification in Cameroon, but in Ivory Coast 
some changes can be noted. Since its implementation 
in the country, certification has accelerated the 
constitution of cooperatives as only organizations of 
producers can be certified. Such organizations could be 
a basis for FLEGT implementation on cocoa: they could 
provide producers with administrative support to abide 
by the law (grouped land titling for instance) and they 
could represent producers in negotiations. However, 
most cooperatives have not been structured enough in 
Ivory Coast to provide such basis. Moreover, a majority 
of cooperatives are private family-run businesses rather 
than cooperatives and the likelihood of them defending 
producers’ interests is debatable (Ruf et al. 2017).
In both countries, there is a lack of transparency in 
the management of premium (at the exporter and 
cooperative levels) (Bouessel 2017). Finally, for the last 
pillar of a VPA, there is no participation of smallholder 
organizations in the definition of certification standards 
and organization, and how the top-down organization of 
Men break cocoa pods. 
Photo by Elsa Sanial. 
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certification ignores local innovations and practices 
has been brought to light (Lemeilleur, N’dao and 
Ruf 2015; Sanial and Ruf 2018). To put it briefly, 
private certification has just started to support 
organizational changes but has still not transformed 
the cocoa sector to provide a strong basis for 
the traceability, transparency, participation and 
sustainability on which a VPA could easily rely.
Would legal cocoa be 
sustainable?
As cocoa production does not have proper 
legislation in either country, fully legal cocoa would 
not necessarily be fully sustainable cocoa. For 
example, agroforestry holds great sustainability 
stakes in both countries. In Cameroon, traditional 
agroforestry system preservation may be 
threatened by modernization (Jagoret et al. 2017). In 
Ivory Coast, agroforestry could be a way to increase 
tree cover in rural landscapes in a forest depletion 
context (Smith Dumont et al. 2014). In both countries, 
there are no legal mechanisms to avoid agroforestry 
conversion into simpler systems or full-sun ones. 
Therefore, using the law to reach sustainability 
would imply going beyond present legislation and 
adopting laws on cocoa production, though such 
laws would challenge producers’ autonomy. In the 
present state of things, legal compliance is not 
sufficient or even necessary to reach sustainability.
Conclusion
“CLEGT” (Cocoa Law Enforcement Governance and 
Trade): Risks, opportunities and alternatives
As cocoa is a smallholder crop, the issue of illegal 
production has to be addressed from different 
viewpoints. For example, if one, from a legal 
perspective, considers that every cocoa farmer should 
have an individual land title and work contract for its 
employees then, yes, illegal production is an issue and 
most cocoa production is illegal. But from a legitimacy 
perspective, usufruct rights are acknowledged 
for farmers through customary access to land. In 
Cameroon, interlocutors never mention this land 
question as being an issue, and especially as an issue 
of legality.
A clean and well-managed cocoa tree plantation. 
Photo by Elsa Sanial. 
A village-made cocoa tree nursery. 
Photo by Guillaume Lescuyer. 
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Cameroon and Ivory Coast hold some potential for 
a VPA on cocoa: the recent interest of the state in 
the sector, clarity on a forest legal frame inherited 
from a VPA on timber, and the creation of smallholder 
organizations as potential dialogue platforms. A VPA 
would though, meet some challenges. The first and 
most important one would be traceability in a very 
complex value chain with hundreds of thousands 
of smallholders and many actors having interest in 
non-traceability or pseudo-traceability. In the case 
of Cameroon, a fully liberalized value chain adds to 
the difficulty. It would also hold risks, the main one 
being the marginalization of smallholders in a context 
of emerging elites. Indeed, full legal compliance 
would be difficult to reach and a VPA on agricultural 
commodities could lead to two-tier agriculture.
Finally, legality gaps exist in the sector but they do 
not necessarily lead to unsustainable practices. It 
is important to mention other issues. Agroforestry 
conversion is one of them and is not addressed by 
the law. To put it in a nutshell, a VPA would have to 
be re-thought to fit with agricultural commodities 
like cocoa as the stakes and commodity chain 
organization are very different from those of timber. 
The focus on legality is on the one hand not sufficient 
to reach sustainability and on the other hand socially 
dangerous in a context of smallholder agriculture.
FLEGT relies on the closure of the European 
market to “illegal” products. The EU can afford this 
with Cameroonian timber because it represents 
a very small share of timber demand for the EU. 
However, it would be more difficult for Ivorian cocoa, 
which represents the main share of European 
cocoa demand.
These weaknesses and risks do not mean that a 
VPA approach would not bear some opportunities 
for the cocoa sector and that public actors do not 
have any role to play in granting sustainability. In 
principle, if both countries have the agricultural, land 
and forestry administrations working together and 
with producer organizations, this could help set a 
coherent and clearer legal frame adapted to cocoa 
sustainability (such as status of outside forest trees, 
cocoa quality remuneration, and land titling inspired 
from customary arrangements).
Legality demands better control of the value chain by 
the state. The Ivorian administration is now considering 
legalization of gazetted forest encroachment 
through the creation of a “gazetted agroforests” 
status. Reforestation and cocoa production in these 
“agroforests” will be managed under the responsibility 
of a private actor. Legalizing these encroached 
gazetted forests may have two consequences that 
may be interpreted as challenging sustainability. 
Firstly, forest status is abandoned for these areas 
and, secondly, company workers may lose their 
independence. Finally, these companies may lose the 
smallholders’ knowhow and accelerate the decline of 
cocoa quality and quantity.
If states and chocolate companies wish to participate in 
cocoa sustainability, the only way is to accept that they 
have something to learn from smallholders, technically 
and socially. 
Several public and private initiatives support small-
scale cocoa production. 
Photo by Guillaume Lescuyer. 
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